The principles of Newspeak, and especially the division of words into three distinct classes, are described by George Orwell in the appendix to the book. Does the project sketched by Syme have any philosophical snag which could not be remedied?
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A report with any winning entries will be published in volume 45 of ANALYSIS. The ANALYSIS Committee has voted a sum of 2150 which will be awarded as a prize if Professor Hollis finds a sufficiently deserving entry.
WERE THOSE DISPROOFS I SAW BEFORE ME?
H OW is the manifestation requirement in the theory of meaning seen to conflict with realism? McGinn addressed this question in 'Truth and use' in a manner that I criticized in 'Is this a proof I see before me?' McGinn defended himself in a reply whose gist is rehearsed (but not endorsed) by Weir in 'Truth conditions and truth values'. Now I believe that the question as to who is right in this matter is not verification transcendent; and in this paper I shall try t o provide renewed warrant for earlier semantical claims in 'Is this a proof I see before me?'.
The manifestation requirement is as follows:
Grasp by a speaker of the meaning of a sentence should be fully manifestable in observable exercises of recognitional capacities concerning it.
This requirement turns the theory of meaning into a theory of understanding: an account of sentence meanings is to be given in terms of what it is that a speaker knows when he understands those sentences. The mention of recognitional capacities is to alert one to the need to manifest knowledge which is implicit, rather than knowledge explicitly formulated in further sentences. The main claim of realist semantics is that the central property of sentences with which a molecular semantic theory should be concerned is that of being (classically) true, even if a sentence's being true is recognition transcendent. Let us refer to this claim as 'Realism' and to the previous claim as 'Manifestation' for convenience. By 'Fact' I shall refer t o the claim accepted by all parties to the dispute, to the effect that we understand some sentences that are undecidable -sentences, that is to say, whose truth value we do not know how to determine by any effective means at present. (We might follow Stig Andur Pedersen in calling such sentences pro tempore undecidable, as opposed to undecidable tout court.)
To Dummett belongs the credit for showing that Manifestation plus Realism plus Fact is inconsistent. In briefest outline, his argument is as follows.
Accept Fact: so take any sentence S that is undecidable but understood by a speaker X. That is, suppose that X grasps the meaning of S, but possesses no means by which he can recognize either that S is true or that S is false. By Realism, either the condition for the truth of S obtains, or the condition for its falsity obtains. If the former, X nevertheless, ex hypothesi, cannot show that he recognizes the fact; if the latter, likewise. But now this contradicts Manifestation, which requires that X should be able to display his grasp of the meaning of the sentence X by the exercise of such a recognitional capacity concerning it.
At this point the opponent of the reductio might attempt to reply as follows:
All that Manifestation requires is that grasp of the meaning of S be displayed in the exercise of some recognitional capacities concerning S; and this does not single out as necessary the capacity to recognize S as true if it is true, and to recognize S as false if it is false. Rather, the recognitional capacities could be exercised with regard to constituents of S, in contexts other than S itself, so that grasp of meaning of the various constituents of S could be severally displayed; whence, by compositionality, the meaning of S itself could be displayed as grasped.
This reply will not help, for one can counter it as follows:
We shall be able to identify at least one constituent that is responsible for the undecidability of S. Let He assures us that what he was doing in claiming that was setting out the realist position before going on to expound the Dummettian reductio. All this I well appreciate; yet still my original criticism of McGinn holds. Why? Because McGinn has not discerned sufficient structure in Dummett's argument to appreciate exactly what role the idea of canonical determination of truth value plays in his (McGinn's) own thinking. I intend to show just how he is still at root committed to the claim quoted above (even if only in a slightly generalized form) and therefore still subject to my original criticisms.
His quoted claim ill-advisedly conflates two theses that ought to be kept apart in a proper exposition of Dummett's reductio. The first of these theses is Realism itself, the proper focus of the reductio. The second is McGinn's mistaken version of Manifestation, which I shall call 'McGinn's version of manifestation':
Understanding a sentence consists in an ability to determine in some canonical way whether or not it possesses the central property of the molecular semantic theory. Why disavow it? For reasons both positive and negative. Firstly, one can give more sensible detail (as I tried to do in my paper) to Manifestation in terms of capacities to recognize purported proofs and disproofs as conclusive or not, rather than in terms of capacities to find proofs or disproofs (hence the title of my earlier paper). Secondly, if we assume McGinn's version of manifestation then the whole argument form above is easily adapted to provide a parallel reductio of the Anti-realist's claim. I am assuming that Dummett himself would have seen this, and that for that very reason it must be a mistake to visit McGinn's version of manifestation upon him as an undischarged assumption of an argument designed to reduce Realism to absurdity. Here is the adaptation in question:
McGinn's version of manifestation: understanding a sentence consists in an ability to determine in some canonical way whether or not it possesses the central property of the molecular theory plus Anti-realism: the central property of sentences for molecular semantic theory is warranted assertability yields (quoted claim): understanding a sentence consists in an ability to determine in some canonical way a warrant for its assertion or a warrant for its denial (i.e. for the assertion of its negation); but (Fact) : we understand some pro tempore undecidable sentences, i.e. sentences for whose assertion or denial we cannot (at the time we claim to understand them) effectively determine any warrant.
Contradiction!
McGinn's version of manifestation invites the old ~ositivists' mistake: that of a three-fold division of sentences into'the determinably true, the determinably false and the meaningless. It would be a mistake even if 'true' and 'false' were given anti-realist readings, as 'warrantedly assertable' and 'warrantedly deniable' respectively. Given bivalence, the classicist revises the trichotomy t o the determinately true, the determinately false and the meaningless.
The anti-realist will accept neither of these tripartite schemes. His ascriptions of meaning are based on a molecular semantics. Such a semantics describes conditions of correct usage of basic expressions (both logical and extra-logical), and accounts for how meanings of complex expressions depend, in a way governed by their logical structure, on the meanings of their parts. In the description of basic meanings, extra-logical vocabulary will receive criterial treatment, with details depending on the area of discourse in question; while logical vocabulary will receive inferential treatment, with introduction rules playing a prominent role in a definition of validity of arguments. In the structural account of meaning-dependence, the anti-realist need do no more than borrow from Tarski and Davidson: for a disquotational theory of truth satisfying the adequacy condition (Convention T) is a disquotational theory of warranted assertability. (For a proof that this is so, see my paper 'Holism, Molecularity and Truth'.) If one understands all the basic expressions in a sentence, and understands the way they are put together to form the sentence, then one understands the sentence. On this fundamental truth the molecular semantic method is based. The theory it leads to heeds the Manifestation reauirement. For one can sav what counts as displaying grasp of the meanings of basic expressions, and what counts as grasp of the way these expressions are put together in any sentence. In the case of names and atomic predicates, various kinds of observable behaviour will criterially warrant ascription of grasp of meaning to the language user. Examples are recognition and matching tests for colour predicates, and ability to perform basic computations in the case of arithmetical predicates (or functions). One can likewise sav what sort of observable behaviour manifests grasp of the meaning of a logical operator. Take the example of negation. The language user can safely be said t o grasp the meaning of negation if he both recognizes a reductio proof as warranting the denial of its assumption, and tries to warrant the denial of a sentence by taking it as the assumption in a reductio argument. Similar accounts can be given for the other logical operators. A speaker's proof-seeking and proof-checking behaviour can also warrant the claim that he understands the logical structure of the sentences involved. For the order in which he breaks assumptions and conclusion into immediate constituents when posing deductive sub-~roblems for solution on the wav to solution of the main prothem (be the problem one of disdovery or of appraisal) will show whether he understands scope distinctions etc. -in short, whether he understands the way the sentences are composed out of their constituent ex~ressions.
Proof searches, of course, may be unsuccessful; may, indeed, be so for a sentence and for its negation. But that is not to say that there is more to grasp of meaning than can be made manifest in the activities of searching for proofs and of checking purported proofs for proofhood. Indeed, I would still go so far as claiming that grasp of the meanings of logical operators can be fully manifested in just the latter activity, namely in proof checking alone. But even if one includes proof search as necessary further manifestation of grasp of meaning, molecularity ensures meanings for well formed wholes once given meaningful parts. Consider, for example, the case of a mathematician who for his first time is posed the problem of finding a proof of Goldbach's conjecture. That is, he is given RTP For every even number n greater than 2 there are prime numbers p, q such that n = (p +q).
Suppose his response is the following:
Let n be an arbitrary even number greater than 2. So for some k greater than 1, n = 2k. I need to find primes p, q such that n = (p + q). Clearly I need only look among the primes less than n. Let's check some examples to see if there's a pattern that we can use in an inductive argument: 4 = 2 + 2 6 = 3 + 3 8 = 5 + 3 . . . so we can't have p = q = 4 2 ; anyway, that would be silly, because lots of odds aren't prime, and n/2 may be even in the general case . .. 1 0 = 3 + 7 1 2 = 5 + 7 1 4 = 7 + 7 16 = 3 + 13 .. . now here's a case where the only two primes that will do the trick differ by more than n/2 .. . but wait! we also have 16 = 5 + 11 .. . so could it be the case that primes can always be chosen that differ from each other by less than n/2? . . .
Nothing general seems to be emerging from this. I need to show that the prime sum can be done for 2(k + 1) if it can be done for 2k, but the pattern keeps jumping about. I can't simply add 2 to p or add 2 to q, because I don't in general obtain a prime by doing so. I wonder, indeed, whether there isn't a counterexample? Say, who is Goldbach anyway? Could he prove it? What?? Do you mean to tell me that you've set me a problem that even famous mathematicians haven't been able to prove? That's not fair.
I mean, I understand what you want me to prove, but you can't really expect me to prove it.
Our mathematician proves himself easily frustrated and mediocre, but his complaint is well taken. He has displayed full grasp of the meaning of Goldbach's conjecture, but has failed in his search for a proof, as everyone has before him. There may be more to mathematics than meaning, but there is no more to mathematical meaning than the basic code of mathematical practice. Goldbach's conjecture is undecidable. By this I mean not that it is impossible to prove and impossible to refute; I mean, rather, that we do not at present possess (an effective method for finding) either a proof or a disproof of it. If 'undecidable' had the stronger reading I have rejected, one would never be able to warrant an assertion to the effect that a sentence was undecidable. For to do so would be in part to warrant the assertion that it was impossible to prove. This in turn would involve reducing to absurdity the assumption that one could prove it. But this would be to disprove it, hence decide it. It is clear that the weaker reading just given is the one involved in my claim that
The anti-realist can admit the possibility of definitely meaningful but undecidable sentences.
Goldbach's conjecture, though undecidable, is meaningful. Our mathematician, moreover, grasped its meaning. Thus Weir's criticism (p. 178j that to refute the view that an undecidable sentence has no meaning does not imply that the sentence has a determinate meaning simply misses the mark in this case. To be fair to Weir, however, it should be noted that his criticism was levelled at an account of manifestation of grasp of meaning via proof checking rather than proof search. To meet this criticism squarely, therefore, let us confine ourselves to proof checking, when assessing the recognitional abilities of a speaker that are, on the anti-realist's account, criterial for his grasp of meaning. Weir says (p. 178) that abilities of the sort Tennant alludes to -abilities to decide proofhood of purported proofs -certainly constitute ground for denying the denial of meaningfulness. But do they constitute grounds for asserting that the sentence has a determinate meaning?
Of course they do. I am at a loss to understand why Weir should, on behalf of the anti-realist, think otherwise. Is he raising a general scepticism about rule following? Is he saying that we cannot assert that a speaker has mastered the meaning of conjunction, say, if all we have is a finite amount of evidence concerning his apparently correct usage of the conjunction sign in past inferences? and is he supposing that this possible indeterminacy in the meaning attached by the speaker to the conjunction sign will infect any compound in which the sign occurs? If this is Weir's misgiving then it is one which has to be allayed by any behaviouristic theory of meaning, realist or anti-realist. I cannot undertake t o allay that misgiving here. If, on the other hand, Weir is not a grasp-of-meaning sceptic for atomic expressions, he must be locating indeterminacy of sentence meaning (for the speaker) in an alleged indeterminacy (again, for the speaker) of logical structure in the sentence concerned. But here again the same sort of evidence is available to ground attributions of correct logical diagnosis. We can see how the speaker partially orders his subroutines in checking proofs (and searching for them); how he breaks assumptions and conclusion into their immediate constituents; how he is sensitive to scope distinctions by invoking rules of inference in the right partial order. And once given determinacy of atomic meanings and determinacy of logical structure, there is no further source of indeterminacy of sentence meaning. Weir himself adopts a molecular account along these lines when he outlines his own brand of behaviourist but realist semantics: for even undecidable sentences But what about the language of arithmetic? The classicist and intuitionist agree on all quantifier free sentences of arithmetic. Such sentences are decidable, hence irrelevant to locating the source of disagreement between the classicist and the intuitionist. Their disagreement hinges on the interpretation of quantifiers. Weir would have to allow us to read further with the changes indicated in his text:
Understanding of the (interpretations) of the (quantifiers) will, on a behaviouristic theory, be a matter of appropriately patterning responses to complex sentences with the (quantifier) dominant, given responses to the constituents.
What, then, is the appropriate pattern of responses to a quantified sentence, given what responses to what constituents? A positive response to (a purported proof o f ) F(t) warrants positive response to (because in one step we can extend the given proof to a proof o f ) 3xF(x). A negative response to F(t) likewise warrants a negative response to VxF(x). (Here I take a negative response to F(t) to be a positive response to a purported disproof of F(t).) But it is crudely fallacious to regard positive responses to (purported proofs o f ) any The behaviour is all that grounds our understanding of the language and its subject matter; and proper attention to the implications of such a publicity principle forces one to anti-realist conclusions about meaning.'
